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Chapter 1
Understanding the Uncertainties of Retirement
David Blitzstein, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Stephen Utkus
An aging-population tsunami is sweeping the world, and capital markets
have buffeted pension plans while retiree health care costs rise without
letup. This coincidence of shocks marks a crucial moment for global
retirement security, since public and private retirement systems everywhere
have fared poorly just as the massive Baby Boom generation moves into
retirement. Clearly urgent efforts are needed to enhance risk management
for public and private pension systems around the world. This book ex-
plores three aspects of the evolution of risk and reward sharing in retire-
ment, to offer guidance to pension fiduciaries, plan participants, and
policymakers. First, we focus on new perspectives for assessing retirement
risks and rewards. Second, we evaluate efforts to insure retirement plans.
Last, we provide several new strategies for managing retirement system risk.
This chapter briefly previews the remarkable findings by contributors to
this rich and interesting volume.
Perspectives on Retirement Risks and Rewards
Many long-held beliefs about the pension system have been undermined in
the last few years. Traditionally, pension stakeholders believed that firms
which offered a defined benefit (DB) plan would bear the bulk of the
pension plan risk. But recent corporate bankruptcies involving massively
underfunded DB plans have clearly demonstrated that workers and retirees
are also exposed to capital market risk in such pensions. And even though
DB plans are seriously underfunded in many developed nations, many have
not yet come to grips with this new reality. Instead, sponsors and partici-
pants often elect to simply wait for rising markets to bail out the system—a
leap of faith that we contend represents poor policy and wishful thinking
on stakeholders’ part.
Indeed, there are several sources of uncertainty in the retirement mix. In
his chapter, Henning Bohn explores the role of technological change and
productivity, future fertility and longevity patterns, and health shocks.
Bohn argues that productivity represents the greatest source of long-term
uncertainty. If productivity increased 1 percent annually over a generation,
today’s children would earn 35 percent more than today’s workers, and
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their children in turn would be 80 percent wealthier. If productivity grew at
3 percent, today’s youths would earn 140 percent more than their parents
and their children would earn 500 times more. Nevertheless, the retire-
ment security debate tends to focus mainly on asset valuation rather
than productivity risk which is often overlooked. Using an overlapping-
generations (OG) model, Bohn shows that some groups—namely active
workers—are more exposed to even more productivity risk than others—
namely retirees. He also demonstrates that demographic risks must be
taken into account since large cohorts, such as the baby boomers, have a
disadvantage compared to smaller cohorts in demanding wages; further, its
flood of retirement saving tends to depress asset returns. Another demo-
graphic risk is uncertain longevity: the good fortune of living longer is
bad news financially. As a result, increasing retirement age along with
longevity improvements make sense and annuitized pensions help
share longevity risk.
Taking the perspective of participants, Phyllis Borzi notes that only a
decade ago, some 40 percent of US families had at least one member
enrolled in a DB plan, but the figure has now dropped to 20 percent.
Defined contribution (DC) plan coverage rose from one-third to over
one-half over the same period, but she worries that the average 401(k)
balance is not large, amounting to only about $77,000 in 2003. This
highlights ‘accumulation risk’ or the possibility that workers will not
build up enough saving or underestimate the amount of money they will
need in retirement. Another obstacle to accumulating retirement saving
arises from ‘breaks in coverage’, due to unemployment or disability, redu-
cing contributions, and employer matching. Furthermore, she points out
that employees often lack the knowledge to invest wisely: in a corporate DB
plan, the costs of hiring professional investment advice are spread across
the entire group, but if workers invest on their own, they often invest too
conservatively and tend to hold too much undiversified employer stock.
Due to the relatively recent arrival of DC pensions on the scene, today’s
retirees have not had an entire career to invest in this sort of plan. To assess
their likely future role, Sarah Holden and Jack VanDerhei describe their
model that estimates projected future saving patterns in the 401(k) con-
text. Their model tracks amounts contributed, asset allocation, and
whether loans are taken; they also consider whether participants change
jobs and whether they roll their accruals into individual retirement ac-
counts (IRA). The research indicates that workers who remain in a
401(k) plan for their entire careers will replace about half of their pre-
retirement salary in the lowest income quartile if they reach age 65 between
the years 2030–9; replacement rates of two-thirds would be anticipated for
the highest income quartile. Combined with social security, retired low-
paid workers could receive over 100 percent of their preretirement income,
while higher earning retirees would expect over 80 percent. But they also
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show that replacement rates would be much lower, around 25 percent, if
workers experience long breaks in service unless they have the self-control
to contribute to an IRA.
Discussions of retirement income risk should also acknowledge the huge
problem of retiree medical care, addressed in the chapter by Brian Fuller,
Anna Rappaport, George Wagoner, and Frank Yeager. In the USA, larger
employers traditionally offered early retirees continuation of medical cov-
erage until age 65, and most also offered supplemental coverage once the
retiree attained age 65 and was eligible for government-provided Medicare.
(Most small- andmid-sized firms offer no supplemental coverage.) Yet there
retiree health insurance provision has dropped steadily: a decade ago,
almost half of all large employers offered retirees health care insurance if
they were below theMedicare age, and some 40 percent offered coverage to
the Medicare eligible. These figures are now down to 26 and 20 percent,
respectively, and continue to fall. This is the result of concern over rising
retiree medical costs that have risen at double digit rates for a decade;
health insurance premiums for pre-Medicare retirees are now 25 percent
higher than active workers. It is also worth noting that 5 percent of claimants
account formore than half of themedical care costs, leading to the problem
of adverse selection in the health insurance risk pool. If employers try to
recoup costs by increasing the employee share of premiums or other costs,
healthier participants will tend to drop out, leaving only the sickest, most
expensive beneficiaries—a phenomenon sometimes called the ‘health plan
death spiral’. More generally, aging workforces and continued double-digit
increases in health care costs are leading employers to boost retiree health
premiums, drop coverage, or move to a defined-dollar approach where
retirees must bear the brunt of future premium increases.
Pooling Pension Risks and Rewards
The recent wave of DB pension fund terminations has prompted many to
review the role of pension insurance, offered by the US government for the
last thirty years and recently adopted in the UK. In their chapter, Julia
Coronado and Nellie Liang investigate whether this pension insurance has
influenced financial practices in firms offering DB pensions. The authors
note that the insurance premiums charged were not properly risk based,
thus distorting funding and possibly asset allocation decisions. In fact, they
conclude that the inefficient premium structure creates moral hazard and
exacerbates underfunding, mainly through inadequate contributions.
They find little evidence that pension funds offered by firms close to
bankruptcy got into trouble by holding riskier assets in their portfolios.
The flaws in the US DB guarantee program have produced a $450 billion
shortfall in the insurer’s reserves, in part because the rules are overly
complicated and offer few incentives for sponsors to prudently fund their
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plans. Authors Neal McCall, Mark Warshawsky, and John D. Worth outline
several key principles that they contend should guide reform proposals,
placing great emphasis on the view that DB plans should be seen as
financial intermediaries providing workers with a promise of deferred
compensation. They also propose that DB plan sponsors and participants
are economic actors who respond to incentives in a predictable way. Finally,
they note that no DB plan will live forever, so provisions should be made for
termination. These principles imply that an insurer cannon provide an
open-ended guarantee without exposing itself to extraordinary risk. Their
reform proposals stem from the observation that pension assets and liabil-
ities must be measured in a transparent and timely manner. Whereas under
current law, plan sponsors may compute an ‘almost infinite number’ of
liability calculations, they argue for a single liability measure. They also
argue again discounting expected future benefit payments using a single
discount rate, and they favor a seven-year amortization period for annual
increases in funding shortfalls. Finally, they additionally propose restric-
tions on the extension of new benefit promises by sponsors that fall below
minimum funding levels. Their proposals address the incentives for plan
sponsors in financial trouble to promise generous pension benefits rather
than raise wages, putting more participants and the government insurer at
risk. Under their proposal, bankrupt companies would not be allowed to
raise benefits if they were 20 percentage points below their required fund-
ing level. Investment-grade sponsors would be unable to increase benefits if
they were below 40 percentage points of their targeted funding level.
Plan sponsors hoping for reform of the US guarantee system should take
to heart aspects of the newly created Pension Protection Fund (PPF) in the
UK, as described by Anthony Neuberger and David McCarthy. This chapter
projects a set of likely scenarios for the recently established PPF and
concludes that the UK insurer will likely have many years of low claims,
interspersed with troubled periods of high demand. As a result, the UK
fund would require huge reserves, which the authors conclude will be
politically difficult to maintain. Since the PPF will face lumpy and irregular
claims, relatively small in normal times but huge after a market downturn,
the authors argue that the UK reserve fund design is economically nonvi-
able. These same lessons apply not just to the UK design but to any reserve
fund attempting to guarantee private DB pension claims.
New Strategies for Managing Retirement Risk
Traditional DB plans are moving quickly to extinction, driven by systemic
risk, economic and accounting issues, and administrative problems. Brett
Hammond and Douglas Fore assert that the biggest problem is that trad-
itional plans did not keep up with dramatic changes in the labor market.
Consequently, these plans are now concentrated in troubled industries
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such as steel and airlines. Additionally, accounting rules permitted spon-
sors to smooth asset values and underfund their plans. To counteract these
trends and enhance DB benefit systems, the authors favor the recently
adopted European accounting standards that require market-based
accounting and curb smoothing of asset values. They also propose a new
framework for DB plans that would emphasize portability. Once common
actuarial standards and plan designs are adopted, workers could purchase
service credits and carry them along when they change jobs.
In view of the growing popularity of company-sponsored DC plans
around the world, it is worth knowing how they are designed and what
they accomplish. In the USA, plan sponsors have a great deal of leeway
regarding employee contributions, employer matches, investment menus,
the availability of loans, and various other plan features. The chapter by
Olivia Mitchell, Stephen Utkus, and Stella Yang demonstrates that a wide
range of US 401(k) plan design features are a function of the average wages
of a workforce—better-paid employees are more likely to have more gen-
erous matching contributions, as well as ‘better’ noncash features such as
greater access to loans. Drawing on data for more than 500 401(k) plans
covering more than 740,000 participants, the authors show that corporate
match rates offered range from 0 to 18 percent; the median match offered
was 3 percent of pay. They also note that actual employer match rates fell
below 2 percent of pay, since not all employees opted to contribute the full
amount. For lower-paid employees, employer matching elicits a positive
impact on contributions up to 3 percent of salary, but there is little
response above that level. Because of the impact of average workforce
earnings on plan design, the analysis shows that a low-paid clerical
worker employed at a high-wage firm would be likely to have a richer
plan with a more generous match and other appealing attributes;
the same worker employed at a low-wage firm would have far less rich
opportunities to save.
A different approach to pensions in Europe, described by Peter Albrecht,
Joachim Coche, Raimond Maurer, and Ralph Rogalla, explores a hybrid
plan which combines elements of both DB and DC plans. Their chapter
traces how a traditional DC pension can be adapted to include, for in-
stance, minimum and maximum benefits, and minimum as well as max-
imum return guarantees in the individual investment accounts. The
authors also show that capping investment returns is the best way to share
investment risk and returns more equally between plan sponsors and
participants. Further, the analysis explores optimal asset allocation-given
benefit and return features. For instance, if the plan caps investment
returns, the optimal investment strategy would rely on a high exposure to
bonds and low exposure to equities. Additional costs of these guarantees
will vary according to their structure, with estimates ranging from 0 to 250
percent of contributions depending on the plan design.
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Turning to public pensions, the chapter by Salvador Valde´s-Prieto asks
how to mitigate political risk in unfunded social security systems which
arise when demographic and economic shocks require action but politi-
cians cannot take urgently needed action. He proposes developing con-
tracts and rules that remove discretion from politicians by securitizing the
revenue stream dedicated to social security. This would be facilitated by
having the system issue Covered Wage Bill bonds, representing the future
revenue from payroll taxes dedicated to social security. Participants could
trade these assets with their prices set similarly to mutual fund net asset
values. This scheme would offer a means to restructure pay-as-you-go social
security systems while internalizing transition costs, as the payoff to the new
bonds would depend on system financing and economic performance.
Conclusions
While private and public retirement systems face deep stresses, made worse
by volatile capital markets, uncooperative interest rates, poor corporate
earnings streams, anemic macroeconomic underperformance, and inter-
national turmoil, progress is possible. Those charged with protecting the
pension institution understand that there is a deep-seated need for restruc-
turing of these valued and long-standing retirement institutions, to restore
the promise of future retirement security. This volume informs the debate
by bringing to the fore lessons from research and practice on these topics
so critically important for the future of retirement security.
Three lessons can be drawn from the current DB pension crisis. First, DB
plan funding is extraordinarily sensitive to investment returns and volatile
swings in asset prices, much more so than previously believed. Second,
mature DB plans have become highly leveraged, with assets rarely well-
matched to liabilities. Third, while DB pensions should be long-term
investors, in practice they confront lethal short-term market risks that
have undermined their survival. Experience shows that pension-funding
ratios can drop 30 percent in a single year. These problems arise from
several sources, including outmoded pension actuarial and accounting
practices which assume incorrectly that assets always earn an equity risk
premium. This has produced confusion over smoothing assets and liability
value, allowing corporations to convey plan assumptions to generate profit
and create incentives to undertake an asset–liability mismatch.
Going forward, the ‘pension deal’ between employers and participants
must be seen as a contractual relationship requiring transparent and
accurate information so that both sides know what risks they are sharing
(see Frijns 2003). If stakeholders are required to finance shortfalls, they
must also be included in the sharing of surplus. The contract should also
include clearly stated, targeted, pension formulas that describe the risk-
bearing agreement between various stakeholders in the pension plan. Both
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the reform of traditional DB pensions, as well as the continued growth of
hybrid and DC pension designs, will be central to this transformation of
risk-sharing among the affected parties. Indeed, retirement security is the
central policy issue of our time: it can no longer be shunted off to the side.
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